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development. It should be supplemented by some system of state
protection of technological , advances.
It is at least arguable that a public interest in technology should
not be sacrificed for a public interest in competition simply because
one is implemented by state law while the other is a policy implicitly
underlying federal law. Thus, Kewanee is as consistent with sound
economic policy as it is inconsistent with broad concepts of
federalism. An alternative would be to disallow trade secret protec-
tion entirely, eliminating the problems caused by partial preemp-
tion. Such a course was clearly too drastic for the Kewanee Court,
both in terms of precedent83 and economic consequences. 84 The
refusal to apply preemption on the grounds that conflict between
trade secret and patent law is de minimis appears difficult to
dispute in terms of policy. In terms of the path which previous
Courts had set, however, Kewanee seems a diversion, if not an
outright anomaly.
W. THOMAS HAYNES
Labor Law—Union Security Provisions and First Amendment
Rights—Buckley v. American Federation of Television and Radio
Artists.'—The American Federation of Television and Radio Artists
(AFTRA)2 appealed from a declaratory judgment issued by a federal
district court3 exempting broadcasting commentators 4 William
F. Buckley, Jr. and M. Stanton Evans from formal membership,
dues payments, and other incidents of membership in the appellant
union. Appellees Buckley and Evans are nationally recognized jour-
nalists, authors, and "exponents" of "conservative" political
philosophy. 5 Mr. Buckley is host and commentator on the serious
83 Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S, 546 (1973), would seem to preclude preemption of
unpatentable trade secret protection. See note 32 supra.
84 Undoubtedly preemption of trade secret protection would result in some loss to
industries which have relied on trade secret protection and neglected to seek patents within
the first year of public use of their inventions. The economic benefits to the consumer of
opened competition in such secrets could well be overridden by the increased costs caused by
increased security precautions and employee salaries. As such, it is difficult to see how anyone
would benefit in either the short or the long run from either partial or full preemption. The
relative costliness of patent to trade secret protection would also act to destroy any consumer
benefits from free competition in all patentable but unpatented trade secrets.
' 496 F.2d 305, 86 L.R.R.M. 2103 (Zd Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3355 (U.S.
Dec. 24, 1974),
2 AFTRA is a "labor organization" as defined by the National Labor Relations Act, 29
U.S.C. § 152(5) (1970); it is the collective bargaining agent for most employees in radio and
television broadcasting.
3 Evans v. American Fed'n of Television and Radio Artists, 354 F. Supp. 823, 82
L.R.R.M. 2289 (S.D,N.Y. 1973).
4 The district court defined a commentator as a person hired to express his own sincere
opinion and analysis from his viewpoint or bias. Id. at 842, 82 L.R.R.M. at 2301-02.
1 496 F.2d at 308, 86 L.R.R.M. at 2104.
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and issue oriented television program, "Firing Line." Mr. Evans is a
radio commentator and analyst for CBS and participates in the
radio series "Spectrum." Neither was or is primarily employed in
broadcasting.°
In 1973 Buckley and Evans sought declaratory and injunctive
relief from the obligations and liabilities of the "union shop" 7 provi-
sion in the collective bargaining agreements between AFTRA and
their respective broadcasting employers. They specifically alleged 8
that the execution and enforcement of the "union shop" provisions
were authorized by section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA), 9 and that the resulting union requirements of compul-
sory membership, dues, and compliance with union regulations
constituted a prior restraint and chill on their First Amendment
rights of free speech and expression. 1 ° The complaint based the
allegation of First Amendment restraint on the grounds that the
union power was achieved under the authority of the NLRA," and
therefore constituted government action violative of the First
Amendment. In effect, it challenged the constitutionality of NLRA
section 8(a)(3) as applied to the broadcasters, Buckley and Evans.' 2
The district court substantially agreed with the complaint and
declared that although the "union shop" agreement was not uncon-
stitutional on its face," it placed a threat of prior restraint on
e 354 F. Supp. at 828, 82 L.R.R.M. at 2291.
7 Section 84 of AFTRA's "Code of Fair Practice" obligated employers to hire only
AFTRA members in good standing or employees to become members on the thirtieth day
after commencement of employment. The code further required employers to consider union
membership in good standing as a condition to continued employment. The exact provisions
are found Evans, 354 F. Supp, at 829, 82 L.R.R.M. at 2291.
8 496 F.2d at 308-09, 86 L.R.R.M. at 2105.
9 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970) which provides in pertinent part:
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer—
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization: Provided, That nothing in this subchapter, or in any other statute of
the United States, shall ,preclude an employer from making an agreement with a
labor organization (not established, maintained, or assisted by any action defined in
this subsection as an unfair labor practice) to require as a condition of employment
membership therein on or after the thirtieth day following the beginning of such
employment or the effective date of such agreement, whichever is' the later . . .
Provided further, That no employer shall justify any discrimination against an
employee for nonmembership in a labor organization (A) if he has reasonable
grounds for believing that such membership was not available to the employee on
the same terms and conditions generally applicable to other members, or (B) if he
has reasonable grounds for believing that membership was denied or terminated for
reasons other than the failure of the employee to to tender the required periodic dues
and initiation fees uniformly as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership . . . .
'° 354 F. Supp. at 831, 82 L.R.R.M. at 2293.
" Id.
17 Id. at 827-28, 82 L.R.R.M. at 2290-91.
Id. at 842, 82 L.R.R.M. at 2302.
While it may not be held that union membership in all circumstances chills First
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the plaintiffs' free expression because of their unique situation
and status" as broadcasting commentators. The district court
concluded15 that the combined effect of the payment of dues, com-
pulsory membership, and threatened union discipline and incidents
of the "union shop" agreement distinctly, chilled and inhibited
Buckley's and Evans' First Amendment rights of free speech and
expression and required declaratory relief." The lower court con-
cluded that Buckley and Evans appeared to receive only "de
minimis" benefits from the collective bargaining agreement and
therefore were not "free riders"" on the collective bargaining sys-
tem.
The lower court focused attention on the extent to which the
union shop agreement as a whole affected the relationship between
plaintiffs' unique status as broadcasting commentators, who are
hired to express their own views and opinions, and the exercise of
their First Amendment rights." In effect, the district court con-
cluded that the threat of First Amendment harm to Buckley and
Evans was direct and considerable, while the overall effect of the
decision would only minimally undermine the federal policy favor-
ing collective bargaining."
Much of the district court's opinion dealt with the standing of
Buckley and Evans to raise the First Amendment issues. The in-
quiry relevant to a determination of standing is whether "the person
.. is a proper party to request an adjudication of a particular issue
and not whether the issue itself is justiciable."2 ° The trial court
Amendment rights and freedom of expression, we find ample evidence in this present
record, of uncontested facts which show an actual chilling of plaintiffs' freedom of
expression. The commentator or analyst, hired to express his own opinion has been
grouped, in the labor contract, with persons described as "artists" or "talent" who
are primarily entertainers, whose expression is guided, at least in part, by script or
scenario.
Id.
" See Note, 53 B.U.L. Rev. 745 (1973), for a discussion of the lower court opinion and
the status of broadcasting commentators under the First Amendment.
. 19 354 F. Supp. at 848, 82 L.R.R.M. at 2307. "More is involved in this controversy than
mere payment of a modest dues bill, and the prior conduct of the employers required by the
union agreement make it appropriate that these issues be resolved by declaratory judgment."
Id.
16 The district court qualified this conclusion by stating that if it were shown that the
commentators had received substantial "free rider" benefits from the efforts of the collective
bargaining agents, perhaps Buckley and Evans would be required to pay an "amount not
greater than union dues" without impinging their First Amendment rights. 354 F. Supp. at
848, 82 L.R.R:M. at 2307.
17 354 F. Supp. at 848, 82 L.R.R.M. at 2307. A "free rider" is essentially someone who
enjoys the fruits and benefits of the union without contributing his fair share to financially
support the union. The foundations of the "free rider" concept discussed in the Evans case are
outlined in Railway Employees' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 231-32 (1956).
18 354 F. Supp. at 847, 82 L.R.R.M. at 2305-06.
19 See id. at 841-43, 82 L.R.R.M. at 2301-02. The policy is set forth in 29 U.S.C. § 151
(1970).
20 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S: 83, 99-100 (1968).
[ljn terms of Article III limitations on federal court jurisdiction, the question of
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decided that broadcasting commentators had standing to raise the
First Amendment questions because their own views and opinions
would be directly and immediately affected by the union dues re-
quirements, the compulsory membership rule, and the possibility of
discipline. 2 ' Prior cases22 holding that the dues requirements and
incidents of "union shop" provisions did not infringe First Amend-
ment rights were found distinguishable by the district court because
such decisions had turned on either statutory construction or on the
fact that the plaintiffs had not actually shown a substantial, direct,
and immediate relationship between the dues and "union shop"
provisions, and the alleged harm to First Amendment rights. 23
standing is related only to whether the dispute sought to be adjudicated will be
presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of
judicial resolution. It is for that reason that the emphasis in standing problems is on
whether the party invoking federal court jurisdiction has "a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy," . . . and whether the dispute touches upon "the legal
relations of parties having adverse legal interests."
Id. at 101. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). In Association of Data Processing .
Serv. Orgs., Inc. v, Camp, 397 U.S, 150 (1970), the Court discussed elements of standing in a
business competition suit. The Data Processing decision relied on a two prong standing test in
which the plaintiff first alleges "that the challenged activity has caused an injury in fact," and
secondly, that "the interest sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably within the
zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in
question." Id. at 152-53.
354 F. Supp. at 844-45, 82 L.R.R.M, at 2303-04. See Note, 53 B.U.L. Rev, 745,
748-52 (1973), for a review of the lower court's . analysis of these issues.
12
 E.g., Railroad Employees' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956); Reid v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp,, 443 F.2d 408, 77 L.R.R.M. 2609 (10th Cir. 1971); Linscott v. Millers Falls
Co., 440 F.2d 14, 76 L.R.R.M. 2994 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 872 (1971).
23 In Railroad Employees' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956), a group of employees
claimed that being obliged to join the union under a "union shop" agreement sanctioned by
section 2, Eleventh of the Railroad Labor Act (RLA), 45 U.S.C. § 152 (Eleventh) (1970),
deprived them of their freedom of association as guaranteed by the First Amendment. The
Supreme Court balanced the associational claim against the compelling governmental interest
espoused by the labor legislation. It held that Congress had expressed a legitimate objective
under the commerce power in order to encourage "[i]ndustrial peace along the arteries of
commerce," and that this interest outweighed the general associational claims of the em-
ployees. Id. at 233. The Hanson Court, however explicitly reserved some First Amendment
questions by stating: "If the exaction of dues, initiation fees, or assessments is used as a cover
for forcing ideological conformity or other action in contravention of the First Amendment,
this judgment will not prejudice the decision in that case." Id. at 238.
Two years later in International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961), the
Court impliedly reaffirmed the Hanson dicta. There, certain employees worked under a
similar "union shop" agreement authorized by section 2, Eleventh of the RLA. They contested
specific union expenditures for political purposes contrary to their own' beliefs. The Court
acknowledged that this complaint fell squarely within the Hanson exception. Id. at 749.
However, the Court declined to reach the constitutional issue because it believed that a fair
reading of the statute warranted denial to the union of the authority to expend specific funds,
"over the employee's objection, . . . for political causes which he opposes." Id. at 749-50.
Subsequent to the decision in Street, the First Circuit in Linscott v. Millers Falls Co.,
440 F.2d 14, 76 L,R.R.M. 2994 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 872 (1971), cited the Hanson
dicta but failed to find the required directness and specificity of interest between the dues
requirements and the alleged constitutional deprivation. Id. at 17, 76 L.R.R.M. at 2996.
Compare Seay v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 427 F.2d 996, 1003, 74 L.R.R.M. 2600, 2606
(9th Cir. 1970).
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The lower court did not decide whether the incidents of the
union shop provision also constituted unfair labor practices under
section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA. 24 It did note that "[s]ubject matter
jurisdiction has been taken [by federal courts] in cases involving
disputes as to the extent of union power granted under the National
Labor Relations Act. " 25
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
HELD: that the federal district court had lacked jurisdiction to
decide whether a requirement of compulsory membership and com-
pliance with union regulations infringed appellees' First Amendment
rights. 26
 On these issues the court deferred to the jurisdiction of the
National Labor Relations Board under the assumption that they
constituted "arguable" unfair labor practices27 over which the Board
exercises primary jurisdiction under the preemption doctrine an-
nounced in 1959 in San Diego Building Trades Council v.
Garmon. 28 Secondly, the court of appeals held that the requirement
of union dues, standing alone, did not infringe the First Amendment
rights of Buckley and Evans. 29 The court reasoned that the dues are
"not flat fees imposed directly on the exercise of a federal right... .
If there is any burden on appellees' free speech it would appear to be
no more objectionable than a 'non-discriminatory (form) of general
taxation' which can be constitutionally imposed on the communica-
tions media."3 °
The Buckley decision appears to have left unanswered more
questions than it resolved. It failed to decide the "government
action" issue31 necessary to a determination of appellees' First
Amendment claims. However, the court of appeals reached the
merits on the issue of the constitutionality of a union dues require-
ment imposed upon broadcasters32 by application of a test of jus-
ticiability prescribed in Bell v. Hood. 33 Applying the doctrine of
preemption the Second Circuit concluded that the claim of First
Amendment infringement in the compulsory membership and union
discipline aspects of the complaint was under the exclusive jurisdic-
tion of the National Labor Relations Board. The court did not
comment on the merits of this claim, 34 despite the district court's
exhaustive discussion of appellees' standing to raise . the constitu-
tional issues and its finding that compulsory union membership and
29 354 F. Supp. at 829, 82 L.R.R.M. at 2290. See note 9 supra.
25 354 F. Supp. at 837, 82 L.R.R.M. at 2298. See Seay v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,
427 F.2d 996, 74 L.R.R.M. 2600 (9th Cir. 1970).
26 Buckley, 496 F.2d at 309, 86 L.R.R.M. at 2105.
27 Id. at 312, 86 L.R.R.M. at 2107-08.
28 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
29 496 F.2d at 309-10, 86 L.R.R.M. at 2105-06.
3D Id. at 311, 86 L.R.R.M. at 2107.
31 Id. at 309-10, 86 L.R.R.M. at 2105-06.
32 Id. at 310, 86 L.R.R.M. at 2106.
33 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
34 496 F.2d at 309, 86 L.R.R.M. at 2105.
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the threat of union discipline placed a prior restraint and chill on the
appellees' rights of free speech and expression. 35
This note will focus upon three aspects of the Buckley decision.
First, the Second Circuit's use of the justiciability test of Bell v.
Hood 36 to avoid deciding the "government action" issue will be
criticized. Next, the Second Circuit's decision to apply the preemp-
tion doctrine to the claims relating to compulsory union membership
and compliance with internal union regulations will be examined. In
particular, the correctness of invoking the Garmon doctrine of
preemption, 37 where substantive constitutional rights are threat-
ened, will be analyzed in light of an alternative to preemption
proposed by the Ninth Circuit in Seay v. McDonnell Douglas
Corp. 38 Finally, the likely effects of the Second Circuit's decision in
Buckley to isolate the dues requirement from the compulsory mem-
bership and discipline issues in fashioning a First Amendment stan-
dard of review will be evaluated.
GOVERNMENT ACTION
The government action question that confronted the Second
Circuit was not novel. Prior to Buckley, both the First 39 and the
Tenth" Circuits had decided similar questions. The issue was
whether a union shop provision incorporated into a collective bar-
gaining agreement executed under the authority of section 8(a)(3) of
the NLRA constituted government action for First Amendment
purposes. In the leading case of Railway Employees' Department v.
Hanson,'" the Supreme Court of the United States held that a union
shop provision authorized by the Railway Labor Act (RLA) 42 consti-
tuted government action. 43 The RLA differs from the NLRA in that
the RLA preempts." state "right to work" laws 45 while the NLRA
35 Evans, 354 F. Supp. at 835-45, 82 L.R.R.M. at 2296-2304.
36 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
37 San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244-45 (1959).
34 427 F.2d 996, 74 L.R.R.M. 2600 (9th Cir. 1970).
39 Linscott v. Millers Falls Co., 440 F.2d 14, 76 L.R.R.M. 2994 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 872 (1970.:
4° Reid v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 443 F.2d 408, 77 L.R.R.M. 2609 (10th Cir. 1971).
41 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
43 45 U.S.C. ft 151 et seq. (1970). Language authorizing "union shop" agreements under
the RLA 45 U.S.C. § 152 (Eleventh) (1970), is similar to that used in the NLRA, 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(3) (1970),
43 351 U.S. at 232.
44 45 U,S.C. § 152 (Eleventh) (1970), which provides:
Notwithstanding any other provisions of this chapter, or of any other statute or
law of the United States, or Territory thereof, or of any State, any carrier or carriers
as defined in this chapter and a labor organization or labor organizations duly
designated and authorized to represent'employees in accordance with the require-
ments of this chapter shall be permitted--(a) to make agreements, requiring, as a
condition of continued employment, that within sixty days following the beginning
of such employment, or the effective date of such agreements, whichever is the later,
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expressly defers" to state law on the question. The NLRA does not
forbid states to legislate limitations on the lawfulness of NLRA-
authorized union security provisions. 47 Consequently, the degree of
government action under the NLRA is arguably less than under the
RLA.
In 1971 the First Circuit, in Linscott v. Millers Falls Co."
"ascribed little significance" to this distinction between the RLA and
the NLRA. It concluded that a union shop agreement authorized by
section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA created sufficient government involve-
ment to warrant a finding of government action and to permit
resolution of the First Amendment issues raised by the case. 49 Three
months later, the Tenth Circuit in Reid v. McDonnell Douglas
Corp.," faced a similar government action question and reached a
result opposite to Linscott. In Reid it was held that section 8(a)(3)
did not render union shop agreements government action." The
Tenth Circuit found that the difference between the RLA and the
NLRA provided a critical distinction for determining government
action in contracts authorized under the respective statutes." The
court in Reid examined the degree of federal encouragement of
union shops under the NLRA and found that the NLRA was "more
neutral and permissive" than the policy of the RLA. 53 The court
found that the "federal government does not appear . . . to have so
far insinuated itself into the decision of a union and employer to
agree to a union security clause so as to make that choice govern-
ment action for purposes of the first and fifth amendments." 54
The First Circuit in Linscott had underlined the fact that the
federal support of the collective bargaining agreement allowing
union shops attached once the parties had agreed to it:
Defendants would distinguish Hanson because, unlike
the Railway Labor Act, section 14(b) of the LMRA, 29
all employees shall become members of the labor organization representing their
craft or class.. .
45
 In essence a "right to work" law forbids "closed" or "union" shops, which are
generally accomplished through the execution of union security provisions of the collective
bargaining contract. See Note, 30 Temp. L.Q. 212, 212-15 (1957), for a discussion of state
right to work laws and union shop provisions under the RLA.
46
 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1970), which section provides: "Nothing in this subchapter shall
be construed as authorizing the execution or application of agreements requiring membership
in a labor organization as a condition of employment in any State or Territory in which such
execution or application is prohibited by State or Territorial law."
47
 See, e.g., Local 1625, Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746 (1963);
Reid v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 443 F.2d 408, 410, 77 L.R.R.M. 2609, 2611 (10th Cir.
1971).
45
 440 F.2d 14, 76 L.R.R.M. 2994 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 872 (1971).
44
 440 F.2d at 16-17, 76 L.R.R.M. at 2995.
5 ° 443 F.2d 408, 77 L.R.R.M. 2609 (10th Cir. 1971).
5
 Id. at 410-11, 77 L.R.R.M. at 2611.
52
 Id. at 410, 77 L.R.R.M. at 2611.
53
 443 F.2d at 410, 77 L.R.R.M. at 2611.
54
 Id. at 410-11, 77 L.R.R.M. at 2611-12.
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U.S.C. § 164(b), allows the state to outlaw union shop
agreements. This misapprehends what Hanson basically
decided. If federal support attaches to the union shop if
and when two parties agree to it, it is the same support,
once it attaches, even though the consent of a third party,
the state, is a precondition. The means by which the agree-
ment is attained does not affect the significant language
in Hanson, 351 U.S. at 232, 76 S. Ct. at 718.
"(T)he federal statute is the source of the power and
authority by which any private rights are lost or sac-
rificed.""
Although noting the conflicting decisions in the First and Tenth
Circuits, the Buckley court avoided the government action ques-
tion. 56 The Second Circuit in Buckley eliminated the necessity of
deciding whether government action existed in the First Amendment
claims based on the compulsory membership and discipline issues,
by holding that those claims fell within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the National Labor Relations Board. 57 The court also
avoided decision on the government action doctrine as applied to the
dues requirement by invoking a 1946 justiciability 58 test prescribed
in Bell v. Hood."
The Bell test of justiciability permitted the court in Buckley to
reach the issue of whether the dues requirement did in fact infringe
the broadcasting commentators' First Amendment rights. 60
 The
finding of no violation of First Amendment rights obviated the
necessity of determining the government action question. The Buck-
ley case presents a classic example of a court putting the cart before
the horse in the difficult area of government action and First
Amendment rights.
The Bell test primarily involves the justiciability and ripeness 61
of constitutional issues for judicial resolution. 62 Bell required "a
33 Linscolt, 440 F.2d at 16, 76 L.R.R.M. at 2995.
56
 Buckley, 496 F.2d at 309-10, 86 L.R.R.M. at 2105-06.
57 Id. at 309, 86 L.R.R.M. at 2105.
38
 Justiciability is itself a concept of uncertain meaning and scope. Its reach is
illustrated by the various grounds upon which questions sought to be adjudicated in
federal courts have been held not to be justiciable. Thus, no justiciable controversy
is presented . . when the parties are asking for an advisory opinion, when the
question sought to be adjudicated has been mooted by subsequent developments,
and when there is no standing to maintain the action. Yet it remains true that
"(j)usticiability is .. . not a legal concept with a fixed content or susceptible of
scientific verification. Its utilization is the resultant of many subtle pressures .. ."
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968), quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 508 (1961).
39 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
" 496 F.2d at 310, 86 L.R.R.M. at 2106.
61 Ripeness concerns the timeliness of deciding the constitutional question. It is inextric-
ably intertwined with the questions of justiciability and standing. See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S.
678 (1946).
62 See id. at 681.
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federal court to assume jurisdiction over an action alleging violation
of the U.S. Constitution if satisfied by an initial cursory examina-
tion, that there is, on the merits, a justiciable issue."63 Factually,
Bell did not present a government action problem as delicate as the
one presented by the Buckley case. The defendants in Bell were FBI
agents." The issue was "whether federal courts can grant money
recovery for damages said to have been suffered as a result of
federal officers violating the Fourth and Fifth" Amendment rights of
the plaintiffs." In order to adjudicate the damages issues in Bell,
the Court did not need to decide whether the activities of the FBI
agents constituted government action; it had to decide what effect
their status as agents of the federal government had on the suit
because of the doctrine of sovereign immunity and the unavailability
of a statutorily created right to sue. The court in Buckley evaded the
government action question. 66
 It decided to resolve the issue of the
constitutionality of the dues requirement under the First Amend-
ment without deciding whether the government action doctrine
would permit application of the First Amendment proscriptions67 to
the private agreement.
PREEMPTION
Initially, it should be noted that in their original complaints
Buckley and Evans had alleged that section 8(a)(3) authorized the
dues requirement, sanctioned the union shop provision of section 84
of the AFTRA "Code of Fair Practice,"" and subjected them to the
threat of union discipline to the detriment of their First Amendment
rights of free speech and expression. A showing of government
action was a necessary prerequisite to relief. Thus, it was essential
that plaintiffs base their constitutional attack on the statute upon
activities authorized by the statute. The Second Circuit, however,
separated the issues presented by the broadcasters into two
63 Buckley, 496 F.2d at 310, 86 L.R.R.M. at 2106.
" Plaintiffs in Bell brought suit in a federal district court to recover damages in excess of
$3,000 from the defendant agents. The complaint alleged that the court's jurisdiction was
founded upon federal questions arising under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. It alleged
that the damages were suffered as a result of the defendants' actions of imprisoning the
petitioners in violation of their constitutional right to be free from deprivation of their liberty
without due process of law, and of subjecting their premises to search and their possessions to
seizure, in violation of their constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted and for summary judgment on the grounds that the federal
agents acted within the scope of their authority as officers of the United States and that the
searches and seizures were incidental to lawful arrests and were therefore valid. 327 U.S. at
679-80.
" Id. at 684.
66 496 F.2d at 310, 86 L.R.R.M. at 2106.
67 An initial finding of no government action would have obviated the necessity of
reaching the merits of any First Amendment question.
68 See note 7 supra.
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categories. It characterized the dues requirements as "authorized
by" section 8(a)(3), 69 and the compulsory membership requirement
and threat of union discipline as "arguably violative" of section 8
(a)(3) of the NLRA. 2°
The Second Circuit rejected appellees' initial contentions that
all aspects of the union security provisions were authorized by
section 8(a)(3). 7 ' Instead, it found that only the dues requirement
was authorized by section 8(a)(3), 72 and therefore only that element
presented a challenges to the constitutionality of the statute sufficient
to justify a discussion on the merits. 73 The Buckley court reasoned
that the compulsory membership provisions and threats of union
discipline as they affected the broadcasters' employment status 74
constituted "arguable" unfair labor practices best left to a Board
determination as mandated by the preemption doctrine in Garman.
The compulsory membership and union discipline issues, being "ar-
guably violative of" section 8(a)(3), did not present challenges to the
constitutionality of the NLRA.
Under the court's construction of 8(a)(3) in Buckley, a union
security provision authorized by section 8(a)(3) ultimately requires
that no employee can receive benefits under a collective bargaining
agreement without contributing financial support to the majority
bargaining representative. It is suggested that this construction does
not address the separate question of internal union discipline of
nominal union members under an 8(a)(3) union shop provision. The
Second Circuit did. not discuss whether the broadcasters whose
membership was limited only to the obligation of paying monthly
dues under the union shop agreement authorized by section 8(a)(3)
were subject to internal union disciplinary rules and regulations
such as fines not affecting the broadcasters' employment status.
Thus the decision failed to distinguish between union security disci-
pline, in the form of discharge for reasons other than failure to pay
dues, and internal union discipline which would not lead to dis-
charge, but which might infringe or chill the broadcasters' First
Amendment rights.
In the leading case on internal union discipline, NLRB v.
Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co. 75 the United States Supreme
69 496 F.2d at 312 n.4, 86 L.R.R.M. at 2108 n.4.
7° Id.
71 496 F.2d at 308-09, 86 L.R.R.M. at 2105.
72 Id. at 312 n.4, 86 L.R.R.M. at 2108 n.4.
73 Id. at 309, 86 L.R.R,M. at 2105.
74 Both Buckley and Evans claim that they have not only been compelled to pay
dues to the union but have also been "required" to join the applicable local organiza-
tion and to comply with union rules and regulations, . . , The union does not deny
that its representatives informed Buckley that the ultimate penalty for failing to
remain a "full-fledged" member would be his discharge from employment. It is
abundantly clear that an "arguable" unfair labor practice would result if the union
should carry out this threat. . .
496 F.2d at 312, 86 L.R.R.M. at 2108 (footnotes omitted).
75 388 U.S. 175 (1967).
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Court affirmed a union's right to impose a fine on a member in full
standing for crossing a strike picket line. 76 In the Allis-Chalmers
decision the Court reserved two questions for later resolution: (1)
whether the union lawfully could impose fines on "members whose
membership was in fact limited to the obligation of paying monthly
dues;"77 and (2) whether "union action for enforcement of discipli-
nary penalties is pre-empted by federal labor law." 7 S The Allis-
Chalmers Court stated that "Congress did not propose any limita-
tions with respect to the internal affairs of the union, aside from
barring enforcement of a union's internal regulations to affect a
member's employment status." 79
It would seem that Buckley presented both of the questions
reserved in Allis-Chalmers and that the Second Circuit answered
each sub silentio. First, the Second Circuit's determination that a
union shop provision authorized by 8(a)(3) merely requires that an
employee financially support the union, squarely situated Buckley's
and Evans' union status within the Allis-Chalmers reservation. The
Buckley court's characterization of the threatened internal union
discipline claims as "arguable" unfair labor practices implies a nega-
tive answer to the discipline question reserved by the Allis-Chalmers
Court. Secondly, the court found the doctrine of preemption to the
NLRB applied to the lawfulness of the union discipline question as a
whole; 8 ° in so doing, it classified the threats of union discipline as an
arguable unfair labor practice without distinguishing between dis-
cipline that threatened employment and that which did not.
The impact of the Second Circuit's treatment of the compulsory
membership and union discipline issues as arguable unfair labor
practices upon appellees' First Amendment claims is readily ascer-
tainable. First, once the court isolated the dues question, the con-
stitutional question that remained in Buckley closely paralleled the
one raised in Linscott v. Millers Falls Co. S' There the First Circuit,
after finding government action in the union shop provision au-
thorized under section 8(a)(3), denied the First Amendment claim of
a Seventh Day Adventist, who asserted that belonging to and sup-
porting the union violated her religious beliefs. 82 In Linscott the
plaintiff's claim was fundamentally associational. She claimed that
membership in a union was contrary to the tenets of her religion.
Once the question of compulsory membership and internal union
discipline were separated from the dues issue in Buckley, the paral-
lel to Linscott is evident. The fact that Linscott talked of religious
76 Id. at 196.
" Id. at 195.
78 Id. at n.37.
18- Id.
80
 486 F.2d at 309, 86 L.R.R.M. at 2105.
s' 440 F.2d 14, 76 L.R.R.M. 2994 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S, 872 (1971).
82
 Id. at 15-16, 76 L.R.R.M. at 2994-95.
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rights and Buckley of rights of free speech and expression" should
not lead to different results on the First Amendment question. Once
the Second Circuit in Buckley separated the incidents of the union
shop provision, compulsory membership and internal union disci-
pline, from the question concerning the constitutionality of the dues
requirement, the First Circuit's reasoning in Linscott became dia-
positive of the dues requirement aspect of the complaint. The dues
requirement, not being a burden placed directly on the exercise of
the First Amendment right, did not, standing alone present a
sufficient threat to the commentators' free expression to overcome
the government's compelling interest in encouraging and regulating
the collective bargaining system under the NLRA. The initial sep-
aration of the various aspects of the union shop provision obviated
the necessity of the Buckley court's examining the cumulative im-
pact of the union shop provision upon the commentators' First
Amendment rights. In this way the Second Circuit treated Buckley's
and Evans' complaint as essentially associational and therefore ap-
posite to Linscott, where the court entered a balancing test in which
the compelling governmental interest was weighed against the
employee's loss of employment due to her refusal to join the union or
pay dues. Linscott held that the degree of the deprivation to the
claimant was not sufficient to overcome the governmental interest
and did not violate the First Amendment. 84 Furthermore, the
Linscott court upheld the constitutionality of the union shop provi-
sion executed under the authority of the NLRA. 85
By separating the dues requirement from Buckley's and Evans'
other claims, the Second Circuit emasculated the relevant distinc-
tion, the cumulative impact of the union shop provision on the
appellees' work as commentators, that had existed between Buckley
and Linscott, and created an artificial parallel that became diaposi-
tive of the constitutional question without necessitating a prior
decision on the government action question. As noted above,"
Linscott had found government action in the union shop agreement
made under section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA. The Buckley court's defer-
ral to the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board over
the compulsory membership and union discipline issues eliminated
the necessity of determining the constitutional questions concerning
the total effect of the bargaining agreement and the powers of the
bargaining unit on individuals exercising First Amendment rights as
part of their duties of employment.
The Buckley court's decision not to take jurisdiction of these
issues rested upon a technical adherence to the preemption doctrine
in labor relations law established in 1959 in the controversial case of
83 For further analysis of these claims, see Note, 53 B.U.L. Rev. 745, 755-56 (1973),
64 440 F.2d at 18, 76 L,R.R.M. at 2997.
65 Id. at 17-18, 76 L.R.R.M. at 2996-97.
66 See text at note 50 supra,
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San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garman." It has been noted
that Garman required that "if the challenged activity was either
arguably protected or arguably prohibited' 88 by section 7 or 8 of
the National Labor Relations Act, 89 it was subject to the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Board. 9° In contrast to the Garmon doctrine, the
Second Circuit in Buckley found that preemption turned on whether
the challenged activity was arguably violative of section 8(a)(3). 9 '
Conversely, if the activity was authorized by section 8(a)(3),
preemption would not apply, at least, if one read the Buckley
decision narrowly, where a constitutional challenge is made against
an activity authorized by the NLRA.
The Buckley decision acknowledged the necessity of judicial
determination of a constitutional challenge to the NLRA by reach-
ing the merits of the dues requirement. Garman, carried to its
extremes, would make the Board the "sole guardian of the federal
regulatory scheme" under the NLRA. 92 There have evolved, how-
ever, a series of exceptions to the Garman rule in both state and
federal law. 93
 These exceptions may indicate that the court in Buck-
ley failed to consider adequately the jurisdictional problem entailed
in a case where a constitutional question also appeared as an unfair
labor practice issue.
In 1970 the Ninth Circuit explored one possible exception to
Garman. In Seay v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.," the court stated
that "[t]he policy behind the pre-emption doctrine is not served by
deferring to the Board where a constitutional question is validly
97 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
$8
 Bryson, A Matter of Wooden Logic: Labor Law Preemption and Individual Rights, 51
Texas L. Rev. 1037, 1039 (1973).
89 29 U.S.C. §1 157, 15$ (1970). Section 7 deals with rights of employees and provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in concerted activitieslor the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of
such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement
requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as
authorized in section 158(a)(3) of this article.
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970) (emphasis added). Section 8 of the NLRA defines and proscribes unfair
labor practices. See note 9 supra for text of 8(a)(3) of the NLRA.
90 The Garman decision prevented state courts from encroaching on the NLRB's exclu-
sive jurisdiction, and provided a basis for uniform administration of the federal policy
underlying the NLRA by requiring deference to the special expertise of the NLRB. See
Bryson, supra note 88, at 1038-39.
91 496 F.2d at 312 n.4, 86 L.R.R.M. at 2108 n.4.
92
 Bryson, supra note 88, at 1039.
93
 Bryson carefully discussed and outlined major state and federal exceptions to the
Garmon rule. Bryson, supra note 88, at 1040-41. In particular see International Ass'n of
Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958), for a discussion of the peripheral concern
doctrine to the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. § 401 (1970). It
deals mainly with cases where the employee is fined or expelled from the union and parallels
Buckley to some extent. See also Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967), which involves the
union's duty of fair representation (DFR). See Bryson, supra note 88, at 1040-41.
94
 427 F.2d 996, 74 L.R.R.M. 2600 (9th Cir. 1970).
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presented. 95. Later, quoting from the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Vaca v. Sipes, 96 the Ninth Circuit said, "pre-emption
depends upon 'the nature of the particular interests being asserted
and the effect upon the administration of national labor policies of
concurrent judicial and administrative remedies.' "97 In Seay, the
plaintiffs, nonunion members contributing agency fees to the union
under an "agency shop" collective bargaining agreement, alleged
that specific union expenditures for political candidates and pur-
poses contrary to their own beliefs were violative of the non-
members' First, Fifth, and Ninth Amendment rights." The Ninth
Circuit sustained the compulsory agency fee as a "permissible and
valid form of union security" but stated that misuse of the funds did
not constitute 99
 an unfair labor practice. Instead, the court held that
such misuse constituted a breach of the union's duty of fair represen-
tation (DFR).'" Seay granted the federal district court jurisdiction
over alleged abuses of union power gained through the collective
bargaining system where those abuses possibly violate constitutional
rights.
In Reid the court noted that Seay appeared to present the sole
case "where a union was held to violate its duty of fair representa-
tion by its actions regarding an employee with respect to internal
union matters as contrasted with its actions vis-à-vis the
employer.""' Under the Buckley analysis misuse of union funds,
not being authorized by the NLRA, would constitute arguable un-
fair labor practices. The court in Seay did consider the question of
unfair labor practices and stated that the "policy of the preemption
doctrine is not served by deferring to the Board where a constitu-
tional question is validly presented." 102 In addition, the court stated
that even if the misuse of funds constituted an unfair labor practice
and the Reid decision 103 were clearly on point advocating preemp-
tion, it "would decline" to folloW Reid.1 a4
The Seay analysis hinged on two factors: first, claims of abuse
of the collective bargaining power did not present issues which
necessitated the particular knowledge or expertise of the Board;
secondly, and more importantly, the adjudication of constitutional
claims has traditionally been reserved to the courts. 105 In providing
95 Id. at 1002, 74 L.R.RM, at 2606.
96 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
Seay, 427 F.2d at 1002, 74 L.R,R.M. at 2605-06, quoting from Vaca v. Sipes, 386
U.S. at 180.
95
 427 F.2d at 998, 74 L.R.R.M. at 2602-03.
99 Id. at 1002, 74 L.R.R.M. at 2605.
t" Id. at 1000, 1002-03, 74 L.R.R.M. at 2604, 2605-06.
1 " 443 F.2d at 411-12, 77 L.R,R.M. at 2612.
101 427 F.2d at 1002, 74 L.R.R.M. at 2605.
I " The reference to Reid is to the unpublished district court opinion of Reid v. McDon-
nell Douglas Corp. See id. The Seay case refers to Reid as Reed.
1 " 427 F.2d at 1001, 74 L.R.R.M. at 2605.
105 Id. at 1002-03, 74 L.R.R.M. at 2606.
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this exception to the Garmon rule, the Seay court relied upon the
fact that "the pre-emption doctrine 'has never been rigidly applied to
cases where it could not fairly be inferred that Congress intended
exclusive jurisdiction to be with the NLRB.' " 106
Aside from an exception to Garmon possibly suggested by the
Seay case, there is dicta in Railway Employees' Department v.
Hanson, 107 often quoted in subsequent First Amendment cases' (18
challenging the NLRA or the RLA, which suggests that preemption
might not apply where specific and direct harm to a First Amend-
ment right flowed from conduct pursuant to a union shop provision
authorized by a federal statute:
It is argued that compulsory membership will be used to
impair freedom of expression. But that problem is not
presented by this record. . . [I]f the exaction of dues,
initiation fees, or assessments is used as a cover for forcing
ideological conformity or other action in contravention of
the First Amendment, this judgment will not prejudice the
decision in that case.' 09
The language in Hanson was implicitly reaffirmed in a subsequent
Supreme Court decision, International Association of Machinists v.
Street."°
Buckley may be analogized to the Seay case. Initially, the union
shop security clause prescribed by section 84 of AFTRA's "Code of
Fair Practice" I 1 posed a threat of more severe limitations on the
individual rights of employees than the agency shop provision in
Seay, which merely ensured that each employee would contribute
his financial share to the collective bargaining representative for
benefits received. The agency shop provision, by definition, does not
"s
	 F.2d at 1002, 74 L.R.R.M. at 2605, quoting from Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. at 179.
"The courts have blithely assumed that federal law would also be preempted, but each time
that the Supreme Court has considered a federal remedy, it has held it free from preemption."
Bryson, supra note 88, at 1038 n.6.
107 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
In International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 748-49 (1961); Linscott v.
Millers Falls Co., 440 F.2d 14, 17, 76 L.R.R.M. 2994, 2996 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
872 (1971); Seay v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 427 F.2d 996, 1003, 74 L.R.R.M. 2600, 2606
(9th Cir. 1970).
" 351 U.S. at 238.
11 0 367 U.S. 740 (1961). While the First Amendment issues were squarely presented to
the Court in Street, the Court decided the case on the basis of statutory construction and
reserved the constitutional question for a later date. Id. at 750.
In Street . . . a group of unions and rail carriers entered into a union-shop
agreement pursuant to Section 2, Eleventh of the Railway' Labor Act, 45 U.S.C.
§ 152 (Eleventh) (1970). A group of employees brought suit in the Georgia courts
alleging that the money each was compelled to pay to the union to hold his job was
in substantial part used to promote political and economic concepts with which he
disagreed. A constitutional violation under the First and Fifth Amendments was
asserted and sustained.
Seay, 427 F.2d at 1003, 74 L.R.R.M. at 2606.
I" See note 7 supra.
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raise the same problems of internal union discipline as a union shop
agreement because it does not require even nominal union member-
ship. An agency shop agreement requires employee financial support
and nothing more. Secondly, the Seay case was less advanced
procedurally than Buckley. In Seay the court reversed the district
court's dismissal and required it to assume jurisdiction in order to
decide the constitutional claims on the basis of the constitutional
implications of the allegations. 112 The Buckley case seems a stronger
one for refusing to invoke the preemption doctrine because the
district court had already taken jurisdiction and had decided that
the plaintiffs' constitutional claims were valid. 113
 A reversal on the
merits by the Second Circuit as to all the issues would have been
more consistent and more understandable.
Additionally, both Seay and Buckley presented disputes be-
tween employees and unions. It is suggested that there was no need
for deferring to the Board's special expertise. 114 Essentially, an
employee's relationship to the union is contractual and the courts,
not the Board, are the natural forum for determining contractual
relationships.'" Furthermore, "the protection of union members in
their rights as members from arbitrary conduct by unions and union
officers has not been undertaken by federal law, and indeed the
assertion of any such power has been expressly denied." 116 The
proviso to section 8(b)(1) of the NLRA states that "this paragraph
shall not impair the right of a labor union to prescribe its own rules
with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership there-
in. . ." 117 A fair reading of this provision appears to remove
internal union security questions from the unfair labor practice
limitations of sections 7 and 8(a)(3). In his dissent in Amalgamated
Association of Street Employees v. Lockridge, 118 Justice White
wrote that one should be concerned
. . over the possibility of denying a hearing to an em-
ployee who felt his individual interests had been unfairly
subordinated by the union. . . [In Vaca v. Sipes the]
Court expressed fear that, were preemption the rule, "the
individual employee injured by arbitrary or discriminatory
union conduct could no longer be assured of impartial
review of his complaint, since the Board's General Counsel
has unreviewable discretion to refuse to institute an unfair
labor practice complaint." 119
112
 443 F.2d at 1004, 74 L.R.R.M. at 2607.
113 354 F. Supp. at 847, 82 L.R.R.M. at 2305-06.
See Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 302-08,
318.19 (1971) (Douglas and White, JJ., dissenting).
''' See id.
116
 Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617, 620 (1958).
117 29 U.S,C. § 158(6)(1)(A) (1970).
lia
 403 U.S. 274, 309-32 (1971) (White, J., dissenting).
1a
 Id. at 314-15 (dissenting opinion), quoting from Vara v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182
(1970).
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Finally, like Seay but unlike Street, Buckley is not fairly resolved
through statutory construction without affecting the overall status of
the union shop concept as expressly authorized under section
8(a)(3). 12° Buckley limits the union's use of 8(b)(1) powers to
fullfledged members only and implies that the only conditions under
which a union shop can exist are voluntary ones. In essence, the case
whittles the union shop provision to its financial core.
Thus construction of section 8(a)(3) limiting an employee's ob-
ligation to its financial core redefines a union shop provision into an
agency shop provision. Inherent in the union shop concept is the
existence of at least minimal or nominal union membership. It
should be noted that the Supreme Court has .cautioned against a
reading of section 8(a)(3) which too narrowly limits the union shop
concept.' 2 i Implicitly, the Court's caveat in both Hanson and
Street, that a union shop could be subjected to specific constitu-
tional restraints, militates against excluding the concept of a union
shop from the combined protections of sections 8(a)(3) and 8(b)(1) of
the NLRA.
It appears that the federal district court carved out a narrow
constitutional exception to the union shop provision incorporated
into the collective bargaining agreement between AFTRA and
Buckley's and Evans' respective broadcasting employers on the
basis of the Court's language in Hanson and Street. 122 The district
court correctly assumed the Supreme Court standards for upholding
the union shop concept generally in that the district court places the
adjudication of constitutional issues in the federal courts and the
creation of federal labor policy, the definition of a union shop, with
the Congress.
In 1971 in Amalgamated Association of Street Employees v.
Lockridge, ' 23
 the Supreme Court narrowly reaffirmed Garmon. 124
Two members on the majority in Lockridge are no longer with the
present Court, while the four strong dissenters remain.' 25 This
factor, in addition to the numerous federal law exceptions to Gar-
•	 120 See note 9 supra.
121 In Local 1424, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. NLRB, 362 U.S. 411 (1960), the Supreme
Court stated:
It is well known, and the legislative history of the 1947 Taft-Hartley amendments
plainly shows, that § 8(aX3)—including its proviso—represented the Congressional
response to the competing demands of employee freedom of choice and union
security. Had Congress thought one or the other overriding, it would doubtless have
found words adequate to express that judgment. It did not choose to do so; it
accommodated both interests, doubtless in a manner unsatisfactory to the extreme
partisans of each, by drawing a line it thought reasonable. It is not for the adminis-
trators of the Congressional mandate to approach either side of that line grudgingly.
Id. at 418 n.7.
122 354 F. Supp. at 837, 844, 848, 82 L.R.R.M. at 2298, 2303-04, 2307.
123 403 U.S. 274 (1971).
124 Id. at 285-302.
125 Chief Justice Burger, Justices Douglas, White and Blackmun dissented in Lackridge.
403 U.S. at 302-32.
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mon already noted, 126 militates against the preemption of unfair
labor practice claims under Garmon where a federal constitutional
question is raised. When all considerations are taken into account,
the Second Circuit's decision to apply the doctrine of preemption to
the compulsory membership and union discipline claims, despite the
lower court's finding for Buckley and Evans, seems unjustified. The
preemption question in a Buckley context where a constitutional
claim is raised in the form of an arguable unfair labor practice
should turn on the substantiality of the constitutional claim and not
on proof of that claim. Thus, the justiciability test of Bell v.
Hood 127 would be applicable and would permit assertion of federal
court jurisdiction in order to adjudicate the constitutional question
in its natural forum in the federal courts.
FIRST AMENDMENT STANDARD OF REVIEW
A determination of the merits of Buckley's and Evans' First
Amendment claims in their totality is difficult. It would presuppose
a finding of government action in the union activities similar to that
found by the First Circuit in Linscott v. Millers Falls Co. 12" The
District court in Evans v. American Federation of Television and
Radio Artists, 129 based its decision on the close associational ties
between the work of broadcasting commentators and the First
Amendment, It found that both Buckley and Evans suffered direct
and immediate harm from the union membership that they were
forced to maintain with the union according to th6 union shop
agreement..' 3 ° Furthermore, the court was impressed by the threat
of union discipline because of the union's past criticism of the late
Chester Huntley during the 1967 strike between AFTRA and the
networks.i 3 ' The district court decided to weigh the total effect of
union activities upon Buckley's and Evans' rights. This standard of
review consisted of a balancing test weighing the cumulative effect
of all incidents of the union shop provision on the commentators,
and the importance of the individual rights asserted against the
government policy to encourage the union shop under section
8(a)(3).
The district court restricted its holding in order to preserve the
federal policy underlying the NLRA but the court did not find that
policy sufficient to warrant subjection of individual liberties to di-
rect and immediate curtailment, especially where First Amendment
liberties are involved.'" By weighing the combined effect of all the
"9 See note 93 supra.
127 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
329 440 F.2d 14, 76 L.R.R.M. 2994 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 872 (1971).
329 354 F. Supp. 823, 82 L.R.R.M. 2289 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
"° Id. at 845, 82 L.R.R.M. at 2304.
" I Id. at 843-44, 82 L.R.R.M. at 2302-03.
12 Id. at 847, 82 L.R.R.M. at 2306.
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incidents of union shop activities on Buckley and Evans, the lower
court employed a balancing test, unlike the Second Circuit's test
which had isolated the issues and therefore weakened the impact of
the union shop activities on the appellees. The Second Circuit, in
isolating the dues issue, presented a Platonian analogy to Linscott,
which resulted in a decision that did not address the basic question
presented in the case: whether the totality of requirements—the
exaction of dues, membership and other incidents of membership
—infringed upon Buckley's and Evans' First Amendment free-
doms. "3
First Amendment guarantees are not absolute. 134 They are
restricted where they conflict with a "compelling" governmental
interest. By refusing to consider all aspects of the union shop agree-
ment on the question of the infringement of Buckley's and Evans'
freedom of expression, the Second Circuit handicapped the First
Amendment claim from the beginning. The Buckley court limited its
balancing test to one which measured only the dues requirement's
effect on the fundamental right of freedom of expression against the
government policy encouraging financial support of the collective
bargaining system authorized under the NLRA. It is submitted that
the First Amendment standard of review required more: that the
Second Circuit take into account all elements of the union shop
provision which might infringe upon the broadcasters' First
Amendment rights. Adherence to this standard would have required
the court to.consider the impact of possible internal union disci-
pline on appellees' First Amendment rights.
In conclusion, the Buckley case leaves serious questions unan-
swered concerning the government action status of union shops
created under the authority of section 8(a)(3) and the concept of the
union shop itself. While the invocation of the Bell test prevented a
tug of war between-the circuits over the government action ques-
tion, the application of Bell to avoid deciding that question in a
First Amendment context is undesirable. Where the challenged ac-
tivity pervades so many facets of life as do the activities of labor
unions, indecision and fence-sitting seem inappropriate.
The court's decision will allow the NLRB to preempt valid
constitutional issues where they accompany arguable unfair labor
practices from their natural forum in the federal courts to the
National Labor Relations Board. The wide discretion given the
General Counsel'" of the NLRB to prosecute unfair labor practice
"3 496 F.2d at 314, 86 L.R.R.M. at 2109 (Friendly, J., concurring).
134 See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312
U.S. 569 (1941). See text at note 30 supra.
133
 The powers and duties of the General Counsel of the NLRB are set out in section 3(d)
of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. 153(d) (1970). See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359
U.S. 236, 245-46 (1959), for the Court's discussion of the duties and powers of the General
Counsel in preemption cases. See also General Drivers v. NLRB, 179 F.2d 492, 25 L.R.R.M.
2237 (10th Cir. 1950), holding that the decision of the General Counsel is not reviewable in
the courts as a "final order." Id. at 494, 25 L.R.R.M. at 2238.
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complaints relegates the determination of the issues to an uncertain
fate. The fact that the district court had found that these same issues
constituted constitutional violations militates strongly against
preemption and makes the Seay analysis appear to be a more
rational and acceptable view. Preemption under the much disputed
and exception-riddled doctrine of Garman should be avoided in the
wake of Lockridge, Seay, and the Buckley decisions. It is hoped that
the Supreme Court will find an opportunity in the near future to
address and resolve both the government action and preemption
questions which have split the various circuits in deciding First
Amendment questions arising under section 8(a)(3) of the National
Labor Relations Act. The course taken by the Second Circuit in
Buckley appears to be an improvident one for both labor unions and
individual employees.
ROBERT PHILIP LOMBARDI
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